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18 U.S.C.  §  922(g)(9), which  criminalizes  the  possession  of  a  firearm  by  any  person 
convicted of domestic violence. 
When  the  Supreme  Court  recently  accepted  certiorari  in  a  case  involving  the 
Lautenberg Amendment, many  observers  feared  that  a  restrictive  interpretation would 
jeopardize the efficacy of the gun ban for domestic abusers.  The Court’s ruling on March 
26, 2014, did not seem to weaken the Lautenberg Amendment.  The reality, however, is 
that  the  Lautenberg  Amendment  was  egregiously  ineffective  even  before  the  Court’s 
ruling,  and  the  “victory”  in  the  recent  case  masks  an  enduring  problem  in  the 
enforcement of the gun ban. 
Specifically,  the  charging  practices  of  local  prosecutors  have  minimized  the 




federal  prosecutors  only  charge  approximately  fifty  among  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
convicted domestic abusers who possess guns. 
This article proposes an  ethical  rule  that would obligate all prosecutors  to  charge 
domestic violence offenses appropriately.    In  jurisdictions adopting  the rule,  the  federal 
gun ban and other ancillary consequences intended by federal and state legislators would 
be more  likely  to  attend  a  conviction  for  domestic  violence.   The  article  concludes  by 
addressing foreseeable objections to the proposed rule. 
INTRODUCTION 
  On  June  5,  2008,  Utah  prosecutors  charged  Ronald  Lee  Haskell  with  a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.1   Records show that he hit his wife in 
the head and dragged her by her hair while  their children were watching.2    In 
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 1. Michael McFall, Ex-Utahn Is Suspect in Fatal Texas Shooting, SALT LAKE TRIB. (July 10, 2014, 
12:31 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/58170309-78/haskell-county-ronald-cache.html.csp. 
 2. Michael Graczy, Former Utahn Charged in Texas with Killing Four Kids, Parents, SALT LAKE TRIB. 
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divorced him and  fled with  their  children, he went on a  rampage.   On  July 2, 
2014, he tied his mother to a chair and choked her after he learned that she had 
spoken with his ex‐wife.6  He then drove to Texas on July 9, 2014, to find his ex‐







head.   All but one of  the victims, a  fifteen‐year‐old girl, died  in  the shooting.10  
Next,  he  drove  to  the  residence  of  his  ex‐wife’s  parents, where  the  death  toll 
would  likely  have  increased,  had  it  not  been  for  police  intervention  after  the 
fifteen‐year‐old survivor of the shooting called 911.11 
  The  Haskell  case  demonstrates  the  urgent  need  for,  and  the  limited 
effectiveness of, the federal gun ban for convicted domestic abusers.   Convicted 
batterers are much more likely than the general population to commit homicide 
when  allowed  access  to  firearms.12    Yet  the  federal  government  has  rarely 
enforced  the  gun  ban,  prosecuting  approximately  thirty  to  seventy  each  year 
among  hundreds  of  thousands  of  potentially  eligible  defendants.13  Critics 
 
parents.html.csp. 
 3. Mark Saal et al., Houston Shooter Had Utah Rap Sheet, OGDEN STANDARD-EXAMINER (July 11, 
2014, 5:21 PM), www.standard.net/National/2014/07/10/Gunman-in-delivery-man-garb-kills-4-
kids-parents.html. 
 4. Id. 
 5. For a detailed discussion of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), see infra Part I.C. 
 6. Tony Perry, Texas Slaying Suspect Had Been Violent with Mom in California, Deputies Say, L.A. 
TIMES (July 11, 2014, 7:33 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-texas-killings-
suspect-mother-restraining-order-20140711-story.html.  
 7. St. John Barned-Smith & Cindy Horswell, Prosecutor:  Suspect in Spring Family Slaying Shot 
Victims ‘Execution-Style’, HOUSTON CHRON. (July 10, 2014), www.chron.com/neighborhood 
/spring/news/article/FedEx-disguise-divorce-among-emerging-details-in-5611869.php. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. St. John Barned-Smith, Grieving Spring Community Gathers for Stay Family Funeral, HOUSTON 
CHRON. (July 16, 2014), http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/spring/news/article/Grieving-
Spring-community-gathers-for-Stay-family-5624952.php. 
 11. See id. 
 12. For evidence demonstrating the heightened risk of homicide when convicted batterers have 
access to firearms, see infra Part I.A. 
 13. See infra note 118 and accompanying text for statistics on annual charging rates under 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). 
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the  Lautenberg Amendment,  and  have  claimed  that  the  lack  of  clarity  in  the 
interpretation of the statute has hindered its application.17  These advocates won 
a  commendable  victory  in United  States  v.  Castleman  on  March  26,  2014,  and 
improved  the uniformity of  court decisions  interpreting  the ban.18 Yet,  the  last 
decade  has  shown  that  the  most  important  limitation  on  the  gun  ban  is  not 




  This article proposes an ethical duty  for prosecutors  to charge batterers  to 
the  full  extent  of  the  law.    The  duty  would  obligate  prosecutors  to  seek  all 
possible  enhancements  based  on  the  relationship  of  the  accused  to  the  victim 
and/or any witnesses, and to oppose any proposed dispositions that would lead 
to  expunction.    The  new  rule  would  increase  the  recognition  that  convicted 
abusers  are  ineligible  to  possess  guns.    The  appropriate  charging  of  domestic 
violence  would  also  have  ancillary  benefits,  allowing  employers  to  recognize 
abusers, allowing victims to demonstrate their eligibility for certain government 
 
 14. E.g., Hearing on VAWA Next Steps: Protecting Women from Gun Violence, Before the S. Judiciary 
Comm. 113th Cong. (2014) (statements of Sen. Pat Leahy, Sheriff Christopher Schmaling, and 
Professor Jacqueline Campbell), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/vawa-next-
steps-protecting-women-from-gun-violence (last visited Aug. 3, 2014) (noting various problems that 
hinder enforcement of federal ban on possession of firearms by convicted domestic abusers); see also 
Michele Richinick, Senate Holds First-Ever Hearing on Guns and Domestic Violence, MSNBC (July 30, 
2014, 3:10 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/senate-holds-first-ever-hearing-guns-and-domestic-
violence (noting that Senate Judiciary Committee had never before held a hearing on this subject; the 
Lautenberg Amendment passed after a floor debate in 1996, not a hearing before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee).  
 15. Editorial, Disarmament for Domestic Abusers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2014, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/opinion/sunday/disarmament-for-spousal-
abusers.html?_r=0 (last visited Aug. 3, 2014) (arguing that “existing federal laws intended to disarm 
spousal abusers have proved largely unenforceable.”) [hereinafter Disarmament]. 
 16. Kimberly Brusk, Gun Laws Still Don’t Protect Women from Abusers, USA TODAY (July 30, 2014), 
www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/07/30/gun-control-deaths-women-column/13332165/ 
(“[C]urrent federal law fails spectacularly” at protecting women from gun crimes committed by 
convicted domestic abusers). 
 17. See, e.g., Brief for Children’s Defense Fund and American Academy of Pediatrics as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (No. 12-1371); Brief 
for Mayors Against Illegal Guns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Castleman, 
134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (No. 12-1371); Brief for National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (No. 12-1371); 
Brief for Brady Center for Gun Violence, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, United States 
v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (No. 07-608); Brief for United States Senators Frank R. Lautenberg, Diane 
Feinstein and Patty Murray as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 
415 (2009) (No. 07-608).  
 18. United States v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405 (2014).  For a detailed analysis of the Castleman 
ruling, see infra Section II.B. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
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II  will  focus  on  the  Supreme  Court’s  recent  interpretation  of  the  Lautenberg 
Amendment  in United States v. Hayes21 and United States v. Castleman,22 and will 
challenge  the widely held belief  that  the  limited enforcement of  the gun ban  is 
attributable to restrictive judicial interpretations.  Part III will explore the reasons 
for  and  harmful  effects  of  local  prosecutors  undercharging  domestic  violence.  
Part  IV  will  set  forth  the  proposal  to  establish  an  ethical  duty  obligating 
prosecutors  to  charge domestic violence  as  zealously  as possible  and  consider 
objections to that proposal. 
I.  THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT AND ITS RATIONALE 
When  Senator  Lautenberg  first  sought  to  disarm  convicted  domestic 
violence  misdemeanants  nearly  twenty  years  ago,  his  purpose  was  clear:  to 
decrease the grave risk that batterers with guns will kill their victims. Research 
subsequent  to  the passage of  the Lautenberg Amendment has strengthened  the 
evidence that perpetrators of fatal shootings are more likely to have a history of 
domestic violence 






that  hundreds  of  thousands  of  convicted  domestic  violence  misdemeanants 
possess firearms.25 
Domestic violence is much more likely to result in the victim’s death if the 




 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009). 
 22. 134 S.Ct. 1405. 
 23. RANA SAMPSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., 
PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE NO. 45, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 12 (2007), available at http://ric-
zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p123-pub.pdf. 
 24. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. at 1408.   
 25. See United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 294 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) 
(discussing 40% figure and speculating about gun ownership by batterers).   
 26. Jacquelyn Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships:  Results from a 
Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1092 (2003); see Melissa Jeltsen, Mass Shooting  
Analysis Finds Strong Domestic Violence Connection, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/17/domestic-violence-gun_n_5595898.html?utm_hp_ 
ref=crime&ir=Crime (arguing that the risk increases eight-fold when a firearm is present). 
Lininger_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete) 6/2/2015  10:14 PM 
 AN ETHICAL DUTY TO CHARGE BATTERERS APPROPRIATELY 177 




The  single  most  accurate  predictor  of  homicide  with  a  firearm  is  a 
background of domestic violence.   Mary  Fan  at  the University  of Washington 
School  of  Law  analyzed  recently  released  data  in  the  National Violent  Death 
Reporting System, and sought to identify common denominators among people 
who  killed  others with  firearms.    She  found  that  one  characteristic was more 
likely  than any other  to  correspond with  fatal  shootings: a history of domestic 
abuse.30 Domestic  violence  also  correlates  with  mass  shootings,  as  57%  of 
shootings with  four  or more  victims  included  a  family member  or  current  or 
former intimate partner of the shooter. 31 









denying  firearms  to domestic abusers,  the rate of homicides committed against 
intimate partners goes down significantly.34 
B. Passage of Lautenberg Amendment 
On March 21, 1996, Senator Frank Lautenberg introduced S. 1632, “a bill to 
prohibit persons convicted of a crime involving domestic violence from owning 
or  possessing  firearms.”35    As  originally  introduced,  the  bill  prohibited  the 
possession  of  firearms  by  any person who  had  committed  a  “crime  involving 
 
 27. Linda Saltzman et al., Weapon Involvement and Injury Outcomes in Family and Intimate Assaults, 
267, No. 22 JAMA 3043, 3043-47 (1992).  
 28. VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN:  AN ANALYSIS OF 2011 HOMICIDE DATA 
(Sept. 2013), available at http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2013.pdfvisited. 
 29. ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-2008 20 (2011), available 
at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf. 
 30. Mary Fan, Disarming the Dangerous:  Preventing Extraordinary and Ordinary Violence,  90 IND. L. 
J. (forthcoming 2015).   
 31. MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, ANALYSIS OF RECENT MASS SHOOTINGS 4 (2013), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/images/analysis-of-recent-mass-
shootings.pdf. 
 32. Susan B. Sorenson, et al., Weapons in the Lives of Battered Women, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1412, 
1413 (2004). 
 33. Id. at 1414. 
 34. April M. Zeoli & Daniel W. Webster, Effects of Domestic Violence Policies, Alcohol Taxes and 
Police Staffing Levels on Intimate Partner Homicide in Large U.S. Cities, 16 INJURY PREVENTION 90, 90 
(2010). 
 35. 142 CONG. REC. S2646 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
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domestic violence,” whether the charged offense was a felony or misdemeanor.36  
The bill created a disability not only for defendants who had been convicted of 
such  an  offense,  but  also  for  defendants  who  had  been  indicted  and  were 
awaiting trial.37  The original version of the bill did not require that the predicate 
offenses include specific elements, so long as they involved domestic violence.38 
Senator  Lautenberg’s  intent  was  evident  in  a  number  of  his  1996  floor 




abuse  are  reported  each  year,  and  that  approximately  150,000  of  these  cases 
involve a  firearm.40 He also discussed  the  fatal consequences of gun possession 
by  batterers:  “[t]here  is  no  question  that  the  presence  of  a  gun  dramatically 
increases  the  likelihood  that  domestic  violence  will  escalate  into  murder.”41  
According  to  Senator  Lautenberg,  “for  many  battered  women  and  abused 
children, whether  their  abuser  gets  access  to  a  gun will  be nothing  short  of  a 
matter of  life and death.”42    If abusers are permitted  to retain  their guns, “[t]he 
end  result, without any question, would be more shootings, more  injuries, and 
more death.”43 
Co‐sponsors  echoed  these  concerns,  stressing  the  urgent  need  to  deny 
firearms to batterers. Senator Murray stated: 
[W]e know from the research that nearly 65 percent of all murder victims known 
to have been killed by intimates were shot to death. We have seen that firearms-
associated family and intimate assaults are 12 times more likely to be fatal than 
those not associated with firearms. A California study showed when a domestic 
violence incident is fatal, 68% of the time the homicide was done with a 
firearm. . . [T]he gun is the key ingredient most likely to turn a domestic violence 
incident into a homicide.44 
Senator  Feinstein  stated  that,  “many  perpetrators  of  severe  and  recurring 
domestic  violence  are  still  permitted  to  possess  a  gun.  Mr.  President,  these 
 
 36. This bill included the following language defining the predicate offense that would result in 
a firearm disability under federal law: 
The term “crime involving domestic violence” means a felony or misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence, regardless of length, term, or manner of punishment, committed by a 
current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the 
victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabited 
with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or a by a person similarly situated to a 
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim under the domestic or family violence laws of the 
jurisdiction in which such felony or misdemeanor was convicted. 
A copy of the bill was printed in the Congressional Record with Senator Lautenberg’s floor statement 
on March 21, 1996.   See id.   
 37. Id. at S2647.  
 38. Id. 
 39. 142 CONG. REC. S11363 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1996). 
 40. Id.  
 41. 142 CONG. REC. S11227 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996). 
 42. 142 CONG. REC. S11872 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996), S 11878. 
 43. 142 CONG. REC. S11226 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).  
 44. 142 CONG. REC. S10379 (daily ed. Sept 12, 1996). 
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press release on September 19, 1996,  that, “[it]  is critical  to  the health and well‐
being  of  countless American women  and  children  that we move  promptly  to 
disarm wife beaters and child abusers.”46 
Senator Lautenberg made  a number of  concessions  to win  the  support of 
Republicans in the Senate.47   They  insisted that he drop the  language creating a 
firearms disability  based  solely  on  an  indictment  for  a misdemeanor  crime  of 
domestic  violence.48    The  Republicans  also  required  that  no  predicate  would 





vote when Senator Lautenberg  added  it  to  a new vehicle,  the Treasury, Postal 
and General Appropriations Act.50 
Senator Lautenberg faced a tougher challenge in overcoming the opposition 
of  the Republicans  in  the House  of Representatives.51    They  sought  sweeping 
changes  to  the  Lautenberg Amendment  as  a  price  for  their  approval.52    They 
proposed, inter alia, limiting the ban to misdemeanants who had been entitled to 






 45. 142 CONG. REC. S10380 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996). 
 46. Source on file with author.  
 47. Senator Lautenberg complained in a floor statement that the Republicans had threatened to 
hold up President Clinton’s judicial appointments if Senator Lautenberg did not relent with his 
amendment.  142 CONG. REC. S9458-59 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996). 
 48. 142 CONG. REC. S8831 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).  
 49. Both these changes appeared in the version of the bill published on July 25, 1996.  142 CONG. 
REC. S8922 (daily ed. July 25, 1996).  
 50. 142 CONG. REC. S10380 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996). 
 51. Senator Lautenberg was aware that his greatest challenge lay in persuading the House 
conferees, who had thwarted the gun ban for domestic violence misdemeanants that the Senate had 
passed back in 1994.  “There is no reason why wife beaters and child abusers should have guns, and 
only the most progun extremists could possibly disagree with that.  Unfortunately, these same 
extremists seem to have veto rights in the House of Representatives.”  142 CONG. REC. S 9458 (daily 
ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).  
 52. In a floor statement on September 25, 1996, Senator Lautenberg said, “I was told last night 
that, behind closed doors, the Republican leadership has decided to entirely gut this legislation and 
say that someone who beats his wife and beats his child ought to be able to own a gun.”  142 CONG. 
REC. S11226 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996). Senator Lautenberg feared a “complete cave-in to the most 
radical fringe of the gun lobby,” which was trying to “emasculat[e] this legislation.”  Id. 
 53. These proposals were summarized in a floor statement by Senator Lautenberg on September 
30, 1996. 142 CONG. REC. S11872 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996).  
 54. Id. at S11877.  
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hours on September 28, 1996,55  the very day when  the House voted on  the bill.  
Senator  Lautenberg  accepted  eleventh‐hour  amendments  that,  according  to 
Lautenberg, had been authored by “enemies of the ban—lawmakers who oppose 
any curbs on guns.”56 








One  final  amendment  by  Republican  Representative  Bob  Barr  added 
language  that  subjected police  officers  and military personnel  to  the new  gun 
ban.59   Senator Lautenberg  later  indicated  that Representative Barr  inserted  this 
amendment after Senator Lautenberg had gone to sleep on September 28, 1996.60  
Senator Lautenberg did not object to the revision when he learned of it the next 
day,  but  he  had  concerns  about  Representative  Barr’s  motives;  Senator 
Lautenberg suspected that the amendment was part of a strategy to make the bill 
less attractive to fellow Republicans and decrease the likelihood of its passage.61 





 55. See id. (“The language in the final agreement was worked out early Saturday morning, 
September 28, through further negotiations with the Republican leadership”). 
 56. Guy Gugliotta, Gun Ban Exemption Ricochets in the Struggle, WASH. POST, June 10, 1997, at 
A15. 
 57. 142 CONG. REC. S11872 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
 58. The new “use of force” requirement in the Lautenberg Amendment required that the 
predicate offense must involve “the use or attempted use of force, or the threatened use of a deadly 
weapon.”  Typically in the U.S. Code, this requirement is defined more broadly to include “the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.”  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (narrow 
definition in Lautenberg Amendment) with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (broader definition), and 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c) (broader definition) with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (broader definition).  Senator Wellstone had used 
the broader definition in his original proposal of a gun ban for convicted domestic abusers.  See supra 
note 45. 
 59. Naftali Bendavid, A Political Gunfight, 19 LEGAL TIMES 42, March 3, 1997, at 19 (on file with 
author).  Representative Barr denied that he had authored this change, but most other observers have 
attributed it to him.  E.g., id.; Guy Gugliotta, Gun Ban Exemption Ricochets in the Struggle, WASH. POST, 
June 10, 1997 (on file with author); Press Release, Office of Senator Lautenberg, (Jan. 8, 1997) (on file 
with author).   
 60. Gugliotta, supra note 56, at A15. 
 61. Bendavid, supra note 59, at 19; see also Press Release, Office of Senator Lautenberg (Jan. 8, 
1997) (“Gun ban opponents, at the last minute, insisted into the law a provision that exempts covered 
offenders from a provision of the Gun Control Act that generally excludes government entities from 
the Act”). 
 62. 142 CONG. REC. H12110 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996). 
 63. 142 CONG. REC. S11922 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996), at S11936. 
 64. CONG. Q. NEWS, Oct. 1, 1996 (on file with author).   
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Two  themes  emerged  in  the  legislative  record  that  culminated  in  the 
passage of the Lautenberg Amendment.  First, Congress expressed its intent that 
the new gun ban be applied broadly.65   Second, Congress  intended for  the new 
law  to  be  applied  uniformly  so  that  it would  reach  any  conviction  for  an  act 
involving  domestic  violence,  notwithstanding  the  vagaries  of  state  statutory 
definitions.66 
 
 65. Senator Lautenberg stated that his bill “establishes a policy of zero tolerance when it comes 
to guns and domestic violence.” 142 CONG. REC. S8831 (daily ed. July 25, 1996). In a press release on 
September 12, 1996, Senator Lautenberg emphasized that “[w]e need to ensure that every innocent 
child or terrorized woman enjoys the fullest protection of the law.”  Press Release, Office of Senator 
Lautenberg, (Sep. 12, 1996).  
  Senator Lautenberg indicated that any person who has committed an act of domestic 
violence, in any form, should forfeit the right to possess a firearm: “In my view, anyone who attempts 
or threatens violence against a loved one has demonstrated that he or she poses an unacceptable risk, 
and should be prohibited from possessing firearms.” 142 CONG. REC. S11872 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996), 
at S11877. That Senator Lautenberg intended a broad construction of the statute is clear in the 
following statement: 
We hope that the enforcement of the law will be as rigid as the law very simply 
defines it. If you beat your wife, if you beat your child, if you abuse your family and 
you are convicted, even of a misdemeanor, you will lose your right to possess a gun. 
That is the way it ought to be. 
 Id. at S11878. Senator Lautenberg believed that broad application of the statute was crucial because 
“[t]here is no margin of error when it comes to domestic abuse and guns.” 142 CONG. REC. S10377 
(daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). “The lives of thousands of women and 
children are at stake.” 142 CONG. REC. S9628 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
  Others in Congress stressed that the law should be construed broadly. Senator Kerry stated 
that “guns absolutely must be forbidden for those who abuse their spouses.” 142 CONG. REC. 512136-
01 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1996), at S12141. Representative Woolsey made this categorical statement: “It is 
simple. Wife-beaters, child abusers, and other domestic violence offenders should not have access to 
a gun. Period.” 142 CONG. REC. 118100 (daily ed. July 23, 1996).  No less an authority than House 
Speaker Newt Gingrich stated that “I’m very much in favor of stopping people who engage in 
violence against their spouses from having guns.” Transcript of interview on MEET THE PRESS (Sept. 
15, 1996), available at 9/15/96 MTPRESS. 
 66.  Senator Lautenberg made clear that his bill targeted “domestic violence, no matter how it is 
labeled. . .” 142 CONG. REC. S10378 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996).  He said that variation among the states’ 
laws should not hinder the enforcement of the federal firearms ban. For example, Senator Lautenberg 
did not want the applicability of the statute to depend on whether the defendant had been convicted 
by a jury, because “states vary considerably with respect to the types of crimes for which a jury trial is 
required.” 142 CONG. REC. S11226 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996). He insisted that variation in states’ plea 
bargaining practices should not determine whether an offense involving domestic violence would 
qualify under the definition in his statute. See 142 CONG. REC. S10377-78 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996). 
Senator Lautenberg intended for his bill to apply uniformly even though “in many places today, 
domestic violence is not taken as seriously as other forms of brutal behavior.” Id. at S10378. Many 
sponsors agreed that the application of the new law should not be thwarted by variation among 
states’ statutory definitions of domestic violence and assault. As Senator Feinstein stated, “[t]his 
amendment looks to the type of crime, rather than the classification of the conviction.” Id. at S10380. 
Senator Dodd indicated that the law would “prevent anyone convicted of any kind of domestic 
violence from owning a gun.” 142 CONG. REC. S12341 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1996) (emphasis added).  
Senator Feinstein, Senator Wellstone, and Representative Schroeder all noted the variation in states’ 
charging practices, which necessitated a generic federal definition of the predicate offense so that 
batterers would uniformly be denied the right to possess firearms. See 142 CONG. REC. H10434 (daily 
ed. Sept. 17, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. S10378–79 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996). 
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C. Definition of Predicate Offenses 
Section 922(g)(9) of Title 18  (“Lautenberg Amendment”) creates a  firearms 
disability  for  any  person  convicted  of  “a  misdemeanor  crime  of  domestic 
violence.”67   The Lautenberg Amendment also criminalizes  the act of selling or 
otherwise disposing of a firearm by giving it to a person who has been convicted 
of  a  misdemeanor  crime  of  domestic  violence.68    Only  convictions—not 
indictments—for  a  misdemeanor  crime  of  domestic  violence  can  result  in  a 
firearms  disability  under  §  922(g)(9).69    Like  the  rest  of  18  U.S.C.  §  922(g),  § 
922(g)(9)  has  a  jurisdictional  predicate:  the  government  must  prove  that  the 





[M]isdemeanor crime of domestic violence” means an offense that — 
(i)  is a misdemeanor under Federal or State law; and 
(ii)  has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the 
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, 
parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a 
child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the 
victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a 
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim. 
In  addition  to  these definitional  requirements  for  the predicate offense,  § 
921(a)(33)(B)(i) also imposes procedural requirements: 
A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense for 
purposes of this chapter, unless — 
(I)   the person was represented by counsel in the case, or knowingly and 
intelligently waived the right to counsel in the case; and 
(II)   in the case of a prosecution for an offense described in this paragraph for 
which a person was entitled to a jury trial in the jurisdiction in which the case 
was tried, either 
 
 67. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) provides in pertinent part: “It shall be unlawful for any person.., who 
has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.., to ship or transport in 
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition . . . .” 
Of course, there was no need to create such a gun ban for felony crimes of domestic violence, because 
all felons are already subject to the long-standing gun ban under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
 68. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(9) (2012). 
 69. By contrast, in the context of felony offenses, either a conviction or an indictment will result 
in a firearms disability.   See id. §§ 922(g)(1)-(n). 
 70. See id. § 922(g)(9) (making it illegal for a convicted domestic violence misdemeanant “to ship 
or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce.”). 
 71. Id. § 924(a)(2). 
 72. Id. § 3571. 
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(aa)  the case was tried by a jury, or 
(bb)  the person knowingly and intelligently waived the right to have the case 
tried by a jury, by guilty plea or otherwise.73 
The Lautenberg Amendment includes other language allowing an exception 
to the gun ban for defendants whose civil rights were forfeited as a result of the 
misdemeanor conviction and  then restored at a  later  time.   For purposes of  the 
Lautenberg  Amendment,  the  forfeiture  and  restoration  of  civil  rights  will  be 
evaluated  under  state,  not  federal,  law.74   A  defendant  seeking  to  invoke  the 
exception for restoration of civil rights bears the burden of proof on this issue.75  
A  defendant who  appeals  a  conviction  for  a misdemeanor  crime  of  domestic 
violence is still subject to the gun ban until the conviction is vacated.76 
One  unique  provision  of  the  Lautenberg  Amendment  is  its  coverage  of 




Congress  revisited  the  Lautenberg  Amendment  in  2006  as  part  of 
reauthorization  of  the  Violence  Against  Women  Act.    At  that  time,  Congress 




II. THE SUPREME COURT’S REVIEW OF THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT 
In  the  last  decade,  the  Supreme  Court  has  interpreted  the  Lautenberg 
Amendment twice.  In 2009, the Court considered the statute’s requirement of a 
 
 73. . Id. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i). 
 74. . See id. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (“A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such 
an offense for purposes of this chapter if the conviction has been expunged or set aside, or is an 
offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored, if the law of the 
applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense, unless the pardon, 
expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, 
transport, possess, or receive firearms.”);  United States v. Wegrzyn, 305 F.3d 593, 595-96 (6th Cir. 
2002) (illustrating interplay of Michigan’s restoration statute and 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), which 
required vacatur of conviction under Lautenberg Amendment where defendant had successfully 
completed probation for misdemeanor crime of domestic violence). 
 75. . United States v. Bethurum, 213 F.Supp.2d 679, 686 (N.D.Tex. 2002). 
 76. . United States v. Blosser, No. 02-40074-01-JAR, 2002 WL 31261170, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 4, 
2002). 
 77. . 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) provides that, “The provisions of this chapter, except for sections 
922(d)(9) and 922(g)(9) and provisions relating to firearms subject to the prohibitions of section 922(g), 
shall not apply with respect to the transportation, shipment, receipt, possession, or importation of 
any firearm or ammunition imported for, sold or shipped to, or issued of the use of, the United States 
or any department or agency thereof or any State or any department, agency, or political subdivision 
thereof.” The italicized language was added by the Lautenberg Amendment. 
 78. . Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2005) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i) to cover not only 
misdemeanor convictions for crimes of domestic violence under Federal and State law, but also 
misdemeanor convictions for crimes of domestic violence under Tribal law). 
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current or past  intimate  relationship between  the offender  and  the victim  (the 
“relational  requirement”).79    In  2014,  the  Court  considered  the  statute’s 
requirement that the predicate offense involve the use of force against the victim 
(the “use‐of‐force requirement”).80   The next two Subparts will analyze the 2009 
and 2014 decisions, and  the  third Subpart will challenge  the widely held belief 
that  jurisprudence  is  a  significant  limitation  on  the  effectiveness  of  the 
Lautenberg Amendment. 
A. Hayes and the Relational Requirement 











offense under  the Lautenberg Amendment.85   He  insisted  that  the definition of 
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) requires 
that  the  statute  defining  the  predicate  offense  include,  as  a  discrete  and 
indispensable  element,  the  relationship between  the  assailant  and  the victim.86  








relationship.89    In  support of  this argument,  the United States offered  technical 
arguments  of  statutory  construction  and  also  relied  heavily  on  the  legislative 
 
 79. United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009). 
 80. United States v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405 (2014).  For a detailed analysis of the Castleman 
ruling, see infra Section II.B. 
 81. Hayes, 555 U.S. at 418–19. 
     82.    Id. at 418–19. 
 83. Id. at 419–420. 
    84. Id. at 420. 
 85. Id. at 419. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 429. 
 88. Id. at 420, 423–25. 
 89. Brief for Petitioner at 7–8, United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (No. 07-608), 2008 WL 
4650594.  
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history of  the Lautenberg Amendment, particularly  the  comments of  sponsors 





Murray –  the most ardent supporters of  the Lautenberg Amendment  in 1996 – 
submitted  an  amicus brief  indicating  that  the Court’s decision  in Hayes would 
determine  whether  the  Lautenberg  Amendment  would  be  a  “dead  letter.”92  
Other  amici  urged  a  ruling  in  favor  of  the  United  States  in  order  to  ensure 
effective enforcement of the Lautenberg Amendment and to protect “victims of 
thousands of domestic violence abusers.”93 
By  a  7‐2  vote,  the  Supreme  Court  adopted  the  Government’s  position.  
Justice  Ginsburg  wrote  for  the  majority,  opining  that  the  most  “sensible” 
interpretation  of  §  921(a)(33)(A)  did  not  require  that  the  statute  defining  the 
underlying  offense  must  include  the  relationship  as  an  element.94    “Practical 
considerations strongly support our  reading of § 921(a)(33)(A)’s  language,”  the 
majority  opinion  observed.95    The  Court  emphasized  the  importance  of 






to  “protect domestic  violence  victims.”98    It  appeared  that  the  Supreme Court 
cleared  away  the  hurdles  to  effective  enforcement  of  the  Lautenberg 
Amendment.99 
 
 90. See id. at 7–11. (analyzing the text of the amendment and countering the respondent’s 
attempt at a narrow reading of the statute’s “original purpose” with the statements of Senators 
Lautenberg, Feinstein, and Dodd). 
 91. Id. at 22-27. 
 92. Brief for United States Senator Frank R. Lautenberg et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, at *23, United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (No. 07-608), 2008 WL 2468545. 
 93. Brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence,  et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 6-7, 27,  United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009). 
 94. United States v, Hayes,  555 U.S. 415, 426 (2009).  
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 426–29. (examining the legislative history, as well as the practical considerations, 
behind the amendment). 
 97. Press Release, National Network to End Domestic Violence (Feb. 25, 2014), available at 
www.ncdsv.org/images/NNEDVPraisesLandmarkSupremeCTDec_2-25-09.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 
2014). 
 98. Bill Mears, Court: No Guns for People Guilty of Domestic Violence, CNN INT’L (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/02/24/suspreme.court.gun.rights/ (quoting Paul Helmke, 
president of Brady Campaign to Prevent Handgun Violence). 
 99. See Tanjima Islam, The Fourth Circuit’s Rejection of Legislative History:  Placing Guns in the 
Hands of Domestic Abuse Perpetrators, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L., 341, 365 (2010) (“The 
Supreme Court’s holding in Hayes ensures that courts will apply the Lautenberg Amendment 
appropriately to properly punish domestic violence offenders”). 
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had  possessed  firearms  in  2008  after  a  2001  conviction  for  “intentionally  or 
knowingly  causing  bodily  injury  to”  the  mother  of  his  child.100    Charged  in 
federal  court with violating  the Lautenberg Amendment, he moved  to dismiss 
the indictment on the ground that the predicate offense did not meet the use‐of‐




The United  States  petitioned  for  certiorari  to make  the  argument  that  an 
offensive  touching  involves  a  sufficient  use  of  force  to  qualify  as  a  predicate 
under the Lautenberg Amendment.103  According to the United States, the phrase 
“domestic violence”  is  a  term of  art  that means  something broader  than mere 





The  government’s  position  attracted  support  from  several  amici.    For 
example, Mayors Against Gun Violence  filed a brief asserting  that a  ruling  for 
the United States  in Castleman would “keep guns out of the hands of convicted 
abusers.”106  The National Network to End Domestic Violence beseeched the Court 
to  support  the  United  States’  position  and  “allow  Section  922(g)(9)  to  do  the 
important work  that Congress enacted  it  to do.”107   The Brady Center  to Prevent 
Gun  Violence  filed  a  brief  contending  that  the  proper  interpretation  of  the 







 100.    United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1409 (2014).   
 101.    Id.    
 102.    Id. at 1409–10.  
 103.   Brief for Petitioner at 13–19, United States v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405 (2014) (No. 12-1371). 
 104.   Id. at 19.   
 105.   Id. at 35-47.  
   106.    See Brief for Mayors Against Illegal Guns as Amicus Curiae Supporting  Petitioner at 2, 
United States v. Castleman, 135 S. Ct. 1504 (2014) (No. 12-1371).   
 107.   Brief for National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 33, United States v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405 (2014) (No. 12-1371), 2013 WL 6228470. 
 108.   Brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 11, United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (No. 12-1371) 2013 WL 6213274.  
 109.   United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1411 (2014).   
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harmful, especially when continued over a prolonged period.110   The Court was 
mindful that a broad reading of the use‐of‐force requirement could facilitate the 





Center  to  Prevent  Gun  Violence,  described  it  as  “an  important  victory  for 
women,  children  and  families  across  the  nation  who  will  continue  to  be 
protected by  strong,  sensible  federal  laws  that keep domestic‐violence  abusers 
from  obtaining  guns.”112    The  White  House  issued  a  press  release  expressing 
confidence  in  the  efficacy  of  the  Castleman  ruling:  “[t]his  week  the  Supreme 
Court decided a case that will save women’s lives.”113 
C. The Fallacy That Judicial Interpretations Constrain Lautenberg 




Lautenberg  Amendment  and  deny  firearms  to  batterers.115    Another 
commentator  wrote  that  a  broad  judicial  interpretation  of  Lautenberg  would 
“give  full  effect  to  Congress’s  intent,”116  but  that  “the  wrong  decision  by  the 
Court could leave abused women and children vulnerable to gun violence.”117  A 
press  release  from  Mayors  Against  Illegal  Guns  in  2014  summed  up  the 
prevailing belief about the importance of the  judiciary in implementing the gun 
ban  for  convicted  abusers:  “[w]e’re  counting  on  the  Supreme  Court  to  keep 
Americans safe.”118 
 
 110.    Id. at 1412. 
 111.    Id. at 1413. 
 112.   David G. Savage, High Court Adds Muscle to Limits on Gun Ownership, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 
27, 2014, at A2 (on file with author). 
    113.    Press Release, The White House, Lynn Rosenthal (Mar. 28, 2014) (on file with author).  
    114.   E.g., Abigail Browning, Domestic Violence and Gun Control:  Determining the Proper 
Interpretation of ‘Physical Force” in the Implementation of the Lautenberg Amendment, 33 WASH. U. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 273, 293 (2010) (discussing the “vital role” played by the courts).   
 115.  See Tanjima Islam, The Fourth Circuit’s Rejection of Legislative History:  Placing Guns in the 
Hands of Domestic Abuse Perpetrators, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L., 341, 365 (2010) (“The 
Supreme Court’s holding in Hayes ensures that courts will apply the Lautenberg Amendment 
appropriately to properly punish domestic violence offenders”). 
 116.   Babk Lalezari, Domestic Violence: Enough is Enough, Any Force Is Enough, 1 PHOENIX L. REV. 
295, 319 (2008) (suggesting that a pro-government ruling in Hayes would “effectuate Congress’s 
efforts to curb the violent outcomes of a pervasive social problem.”). 
 117. This quote is from an opinion piece about Castleman by a leader of Moms Demand Action for 
Gun Sense in America.  Linda McFadyen-Ketchum, Supreme Court Must Protect Victims of Domestic 
Violence, HUFF. POST, Jan. 15, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 1225727. 
 118.   Press Release, Mayors Against Illegal Guns, Case Will Determine Whether Domestic 
Violence Offenders Can Possess Guns (Jan. 15, 2014), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/ 
news-releases/statement-from-mayors-against-illegal-guns-on-united-states-v-castleman-
240313601.html). 
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This  faith  is  misplaced.    The  Supreme  Court’s  interpretations  of  the 
Lautenberg Amendment matter very little if federal prosecutors rarely utilize the 
statute.    Favorable  interpretations  of  the  relational  requirement  or  the  use‐of‐
force  requirement  do  not  put  gun‐toting  batterers  in  prison.    The  Court’s 
willingness  to  construe  18  U.S.C.  §  921(a)(33)(A)  in  accordance  with 






Amendment.119  The  Supreme Court  decided Hayes  in  February  2009,  and  one 
might have expected an  increase  in the number of charges filed thereafter.   But 
the number of defendants  charged under  the Lautenberg Amendment  in  2009 
actually dropped to 49.  The number rose to 56 in 2010, dropped to 40 in 2011, and 
dropped  further  to 32  in 2012.120    In none of  the  four years  following  the Hayes 
ruling did the number of defendants charged under the Lautenberg Amendment 
exceed the number charged in the year immediately prior to the Hayes ruling.121  




There  is  no  cause  for  optimism  that  Castleman  will  make  more  of  a 
difference.    Indeed,  very  few  jurisdictions  had  interpreted  the  use‐of‐force 
requirement  restrictively  before  the  Court  overruled  this  interpretation  in 
Castleman,122  so  there  is  little  reason  to  expect  that  it  will  bring  increased 
prosecutions under the Lautenberg Amendment. 
Some  advocates  who  defend  the  efficacy  of  the  gun  ban  for  convicted 
abusers point to the total number of background checks that led to denials due to 
a  prior  conviction  for  domestic  violence.    For  example,  Senator  Lautenberg 
himself  referred  to  thousands  of  purchases  prevented  by  his  amendment.123 
Background checks do not deny guns  to all  convicted batterers, however. One 
 
 119. This figure indicates the number of cases in which a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) was 
the “lead charge,” which is generally true when an indictment includes § 922(g)(9), because U.S. 
Attorneys like to draw attention to their use of this statute. See TRANSACTION RECORDS ACCESS 
CLEARINGHOUSE, SYRACUSE UNIV., FEDERAL WEAPONS ENFORCEMENT:  A MOVING TARGET, (2013), 
available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/307/. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. United States v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1410 (2014); see also Adam Kersey, Misdemeanants, 
Firearms, and Discretion: The Practical Impact of the Debate Over “Physical Force” and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), 
49 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV., 1904–16 (2008) (noting that even by 2008, most federal circuit courts 
reaching the question had taken the position that the United States would later advocate in 
Castleman).  
 123. In 2008, Senator Lautenberg claimed on his campaign website that the Lautenberg 
Amendment had stopped thousands of attempted gun purchases by convicted domestic violence 
misdemeanants. See On The Issues, ON THE ISSUES http://www.ontheissues.org/Domestic 
/Frank_Lautenberg_Gun_Control.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2014) (citing to Senator Lautenberg’s 
original statement on www.lautenbergfornj.com, Aug, 12, 2008).  
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problem  is  that  the  background  checks  rely  on  an  incomplete  database  of 
convictions that undercounts misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence.124  Even 
when  a  background  check  thwarts  an  attempted  purchase  by  a  convicted 
domestic  violence  misdemeanant,  the  hindrance  is  usually  only  momentary.  
Purchasers disqualified  in background checks easily buy guns from sellers who 
are not  federally  licensed, and who do not need  to  run background  checks on 
purchasers.125    For  example,  neighbors  and  vendors  at  gun  shows  are  exempt 
from  running background  checks.126   Further,  the black market provides many 
options  to  a  determined  purchaser.    Enforcement  that  consists  primarily  of 
background checks by  licensed dealers, as opposed to prosecution for unlawful 
possession, provides scant protection for victims of domestic violence. 
In  sum,  the  sanguine  commentary on Hayes  and Castleman masks  a more 
basic  problem  that  limits  the  effectiveness  of  the  Lautenberg  Amendment.  
Federal  prosecutors  simply  do  not  utilize  the  Lautenberg  Amendment  very 
much,  and  their willingness  to  use  the  statute  does  not  seem  sensitive  to  the 
Supreme Court’s construction of the language in § 921(a)(33)(A).  The reasons for 
underutilization of  the Lautenberg Amendment by  federal prosecutors  are  the 
focus of the Part III. 
III. THE REAL CULPRIT: UNDERCHARGING BY LOCAL PROSECUTORS 




 124. Senator Chuck Grassley testified on July 30, 2014, that states’ submissions to the federal NCIS 
database are woefully insufficient to ensure that background checks will detect all gun purchasers 
with convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence.  According to Senator Grassley’s 
testimony, only 36 states have submitted any domestic violence misdemeanor convictions to the 
NCIS index, and of these, 21 states have submitted 20 or fewer records.  Taking Effective Action Against 
Perpetrators of Domestic Violence: Hearing on VAWA Next Steps: Protecting Women from Gun Violence, 
(July 30, 2014), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/taking-effective-
action-against-perpetrators-domestic-violence. 
 125. The National Network to End Domestic Violence noted that gun shows allow convicted 
domestic violence misdemeanants to obtain firearms despite the Lautenberg Amendment, because 
dealers at gun shows do not need to run background checks: “In more than 40 states, criminal 
convicted of domestic violence offenses (and other prohibited purchasers) can avoid background 
checks by buying guns – often at gun shows or though anonymous online transactions – from 
unlicensed private sellers who are not required by current federal law to conduct background 
checks.”  Too Many Domestic Homicide Victims, NATIONAL NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
(Feb. 24, 2014),  http://nnedv.org/news/4218-too-many-domestic-violence-homicide-victims.html 
(last visited Aug. 19, 2014); see also Interview by Bob Schieffer with Michael Bloomberg, Mayor of 
New York (July 22, 2012), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcripts-
july-22-2012-aurora-mayor-and-police-chief-mayor-bloomberg-pm-netanyahu/ (last visited Aug. 19, 
2014) (asserting that there are no background checks in approximately 40% of all gun transactions). 
 126. Bloomberg, supra note 125; NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 125. 
 127. Proof of possession is usually fairly straightforward.  In a large percentage of prosecutions 
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), the prosecutor just calls the police officer who found the weapon, 
typically in a vehicle stop or during execution of a search warrant.  Unlike other prosecutions of 
batterers, a prosecution for firearm possession by a convicted batterer rarely necessitates that the 
government call a battered woman to the stand. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After 
Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 817-18 (2005) (noting that charge of gun possession by convicted 
domestic violence misdemeanant is easier to prove that charge of domestic assault). 
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made  easier  by  the  Supreme  Court’s  favorable  jurisprudence).128    The  low 




  Why  do  federal  law  enforcement  officers  refer  so  few  prosecutable  cases 
under  the  Lautenberg  Amendment?    The  explanation  lies  in  the  difficulty  of 
finding  such  convictions  in  federal  databases  such  as  the  National  Instant 
Criminal  Background  Check  System  (NICS).130    Underreporting  of  qualifying 
convictions to NICS remained a significant problem even in 2014.131  Even when 
local  jurisdictions  enter  qualifying  convictions  into  NICS,  they  are  not 
conspicuous  as  predicates  for  18  U.S.C.  §  922(g)(9),  because  most  are  under 
generic  assault  statutes  that  do  not  require  proof  of  domestic  abuse.132    As 
Senator  Lautenberg  himself  cautioned  when  advocating  for  passage  of  his 
amendment in 1996: 
 
 128. See infra subsections II.A-B. 
 129. During the period from 2000 to 2002, referrals for prosecutions under both § 922(g)(8) (the 
gun ban for batterers subject to restraining orders) and § 922(g)(9) (the gun ban for convicted 
domestic violence misdemeanants) made up just 3% of all referrals to federal prosecutors under the 
broad heading of family violence.  MATTHEW R. DUROSE et al., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY 
VIOLENCE STATISTICS:  INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 51 (2005) (referring 
to 2000-02), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2014).  
The 3% figure includes referrals of both felony predicates and misdemeanor predicates involving 
domestic violence, so the number of referrals that uniquely matched the requirements of the gun ban 
for convicted domestic violence misdemeanants (as opposed to the general gun ban for felons) was 
even smaller.  Kersey, supra note 122, at 1920.  
 130. Bernard H. Teodorski, the National Vice President of the Fraternal Order of Police, testified 
before Congress when the Lautenberg Amendment was under consideration.  He expressed his fear 
that convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence would be difficult to detect.  “The 
statute has created a large new category of prohibited persons lacking adequate definition – 
enforcement turns on the highly fact-specific findings in each individual case.  From any standpoint, 
the statute is an enforcement nightmare.”  Amend Section 658 of the Fiscal Year 1997 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act: Gun Ban for Individuals Convicted of a Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence Before 
the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of  Bernard H. 
Teodorski, National Vice President of the Fraternal Order of Police) (source on file with author).  
 131. Senator Chuck Grassley testified on July 30, 2014, that states’ submissions to the federal NCIS 
database are woefully insufficient to ensure that background checks will detect all gun purchasers 
with convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence.  According to Senator Grassley’s 
testimony, only 36 states have submitted any domestic violence misdemeanor convictions to the 
NCIS index, and of these, 21 states have submitted 20 or fewer records.  Testimony of Senator Chuck 
Grassley, Senate Judiciary Committee, Hearing on VAWA Next Steps:  Protecting Women from Gun 
Violence, July 30, 2014, prepared statement available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-
releases/taking-effective-action-against-perpetrators-domestic-violence (last visited Aug. 16, 2014).  
 132. Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor & James A. Mercy, Disarming Batterers: the Impact of Domestic 
Violence Firearm Laws, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 186–77 (Jens 
Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (discussing challenge that misdemeanor crimes of domestic 
violence are not properly memorialized in federal databases of convictions; this problem significantly 
limits the effectiveness of the gun ban for convicted domestic violence misdemeanants); cf. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-720, GUN CONTROL: OPPORTUNITIES TO CLOSE LOOPHOLES IN THE 
NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM 17–23 (2003) (noting that NICS process for 
recording convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence is insufficient swift and through, 
and as a result, an alarming number of convicted domestic violence misdemeanants are able to buy 
firearms despite undergoing background checks).  
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Convictions for domestic violence-related crimes often are for crimes, such as 
assault, that are not explicitly identified as related to domestic violence.  
Therefore it will not always be possible for law enforcement authorities to 
determine from the face of someone’s criminal record whether a particular 
misdemeanor conviction involves domestic violence, as defined in the new 
law.133 
The challenge of discerning domestic violence  is particularly difficult when  the 
defendant  enters  a  guilty  plea  –  the  most  common  type  of  conviction  under 
simple  assault  statutes.134    There  may  be  an  abundance  of  misdemeanor 
convictions  that  could  qualify  under  the  Lautenberg  Amendment,  but  these 
convictions are difficult to recognize in federal databases. 
The  lack  of  clarity  is  due  in  large  part  to  local  prosecutors’  practice  of 
undercharging  domestic  violence  in  the  first  place.    Local  prosecutors  rarely 
charge  defendants  under  the  specialized  statutes  that  clearly  indicate  the 
commission of domestic violence,135 even though these statutes now exist in half 
the  states.136    Prosecutors  are  presently  under  no  obligation  to  invoke  the 
specialized  statutes,  and  they  prefer  to  file  more  general  assault  charges  or 
reduced  charges.137    The  following  subsections  consider  the  reasons  why 
prosecutors  undercharge  domestic  violence,  the  harmful  effects  of  such 
undercharging,  and  the  inadequacy  of  current  safeguards  designed  to  ensure 
appropriate charging. 
A. Reasons for Undercharging 
Undercharging  of  domestic  violence  can  take  several  forms.    Sometimes, 
local prosecutors  select  a  lenient  charge,  or  a  charge without  an  enhancement 
 
 133. 142 CONG. REC. 26675 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
 134. E.g., United States v. Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139, 140-41, 145 (2d Cir. 2002) (attempting to 
discern whether requisite relationship existed by examining documents from state proceeding, 
including statement of conviction and transcript from plea hearing, and ultimately remanding 
question because there was “no information in the indictment, the plea hearing transcript, or the 
statement of conviction describing the nature of the relationship between the Defendant and his 
victim”). 
 135. Local prosecutors generally charge domestic violence under generic assault statutes, even 
when more specialized statutes are available.  As the Supreme Court observed in 2014, “even 
perpetrators of severe domestic violence are often convicted under generally applicable assault and 
battery laws”.  U.S. v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1415 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also U.S. v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 427 (“[Even in states] with criminal statutes that specifically 
proscribed domestic violence . . . domestic abusers were (and are) routinely prosecuted under 
generally applicable assault or battery laws”). 
 136. Brief for  Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners 
at 6, United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009); see also BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, NAT’L 
CTR. ON FULL FAITH AND CREDIT, STATE STATUTES:  MISDEMEANOR CRIMES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
(2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/docs/State-MCDV-Matrix.pdf (setting forth a 
matrix of state statutes defining misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence). 
 137. JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 3.09 (3d. 2003) (noting that charging 
decision is made “virtually free from judicial control”); Brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun 
Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009), 
supra note 136 (“Even in states that have laws that include such a relationship as an element, 
prosecutors have been free to bring charges or accept pleas that do not include the relationship as an 
element of the crime . . .”).  
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based  on  the  relationship  between  the  offender  and  the  victim.   Other  times, 
prosecutors dismiss the case altogether.  Even when they file strict charges at the 
outset,  they  might  later  engage  in  “charge  bargaining”  as  part  of  plea 
negotiations.  Prosecutors might agree to dispose of charges by means of pretrial 
diversion, such that the defendant would avoid punishment  if he keeps a clean 





view  that  is “disdainful of prosecuting domestic violence cases” because of  the 
perception that such cases are “trivial.”139  A prosecutor with such a view might 
sympathize with defendants and not want  to  take away  their  rights  to possess 
firearms,  especially  if  the  defendants  are  law  enforcement  officers  or military 
personnel whose loss of gun rights might cause them to lose their jobs.140 
Alternatively, some local prosecutors might choose to “deal down” cases for 
the  sake  of  expediency.141    These  prosecutors  may  believe  that  they  will 
accomplish more good by  charging  a  large volume of domestic violence  cases 
and disposing of them quickly through plea agreements.  The prosecutors might 




difficult  to  take  such  cases  to  trial.   Complainants  in  domestic  violence  cases 
often recant or refuse to testify.143  Their reluctance can create major problems for 
the  prosecution,  especially  after  the  Supreme  Court’s  rulings  under  the 
 
 138. Senator Frank Lautenberg discussed this problem in a floor statement.  “Under current 
Federal law, it is illegal for persons convicted of felonies to possess firearms.  Yet, many people who 
engage in serious spousal or child abuse ultimately are not charged with or convicted of felonies.  At 
the end of the day, due to outdated laws or thinking, they are, at most, convicted of a misdemeanor.  
In fact, most of hose who commit family violence are never even prosecuted.  But when they are, one-
third of the cases that would be considered felonies, if committed by strangers, are instead filed as 
misdemeanors.  The fact is that in many places domestic violence is not taken as seriously as other 
forms of brutal behavior.  Often acts of serious spousal abuse are not even considered felonies.”  142 
CONG. REC. S10377-78 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996).  
 139. Donald J. Rebovich, Prosecution Response to Domestic Violence:  Results of a Survey of Large 
Jurisdictions, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 176, 176-77 (1996).  
 140. Kersey, supra note 122, at 1924 (“The decision to prosecute may hinge on the decision to take 
away the ability to possess a firearm.  The decision to remove firearms may be especially difficult in 
law enforcement or military contexts.”).  
 141. EVE S. BUZAWA et al., RESPONDING TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  THE INTERSECTION OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE AND HUMAN SERVICES 130 (4th ed. 2012) (analyzing prosecutors’ tendency to charge generic, 
simple battery even when a more specific charge for domestic violence might be possible, and 
attributing this tendency in part of budget pressures, among other factors).  
 142. See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH:  A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING 
IN AMERICA (2003) (noting that one reason for the growing popularity of plea bargaining is the desire 
to clear up crowded dockets).  
 143. The California Supreme Court cited expert testimony that "[a]bout 80 to 85 percent of victims 
‘actually recant at some point’ in prosecutions of domestic violence.  See People v. Brown, 33 Cal.4th 
892, 897 (2004). 
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Confrontation Clause that an accuser’s hearsay statement might be inadmissible 




domestic  violence  statutes.    The  Court’s  recent  jurisprudence  might  breed 
overconfidence among local prosecutors that a generic assault conviction with a 
scant  record  is  all  that  federal  prosecutors  need  to  charge  the  Lautenberg 
Amendment.    While  Hayes  and  Castleman  may  improve  the  likelihood  that 
federal prosecutors  can use  simple  assaults  as predicates,  these decisions may 
have  also  decreased  the  likelihood  that  federal  law  enforcement  officials  can 
recognize the predicates in databases. 
B. Effects of Undercharging 
As noted  at  the outset of Part  III, undercharging of domestic violence by 
local  prosecutors  hinders  the  enforcement  of  the  Lautenberg  Amendment 
because  the potential predicates are hard  to detect.   Many  commentators have 




“fails  spectacularly”  in  its  goal  of  protecting  women  from  gun  violence.”149  
When  the  U.S.  Senate  Judiciary  Committee  held  a  hearing,  on  July  30,  2014, 




 144. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 750 (2005) (noting 
dramatic increase in dismissals of domestic violence prosecutions following Supreme Court’s 
reinvigoration of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington).  
 145. See Disarmament, supra note 15 (“[E]xisting federal laws intended to disarm spousal abusers 
have proved largely unenforceable”).   
 146. Melanie C. Schneider, The Imprecise Draftsmanship of the Lautenberg Amendment and the 
Resulting Problems for the Judiciary, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 505, 547 (2008) (declaring that 
Lautenberg Amendment is “manifestly unworkable” even when courts are willing to interpret 
language favorably to law enforcement).   
 147. Jennifer L. Vainik, Kiss, Kiss, Bang, Bang:  How Current Approaches to Guns and Domestic 
Violence Fail to Save Women’s Lives, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1113, 1130 (2007).  According to Vainik, the 
federal gun bans for domestic abusers “have not proven to be an effective means of addressing gun 
violence against women.”  Id. at 1127.   
 148. See infra Part I.A.   
 149. Kimberly Brusk, Gun Laws Still Don’t Protect Women from Abusers, U.S.A. TODAY (July 30, 
2014), available at www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/07/30/gun-control-deaths-women-
column/13332165/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2014) (“[C]urrent federal law fails spectacularly” at protecting 
women from gun crimes committed by convicted domestic abusers).   
 150. E.g., VAWA Next Steps: Protecting Women From Gun Violence: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary 
Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (statements of Sen. Pat Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm., Christopher 
Schmaling, Sheriff, Racine County, Wisconsin, and Jacqueline Campbell, Professor, Johns Hopkins 
School of Nursing),)), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/vawa-next-steps-
protecting-women-from-gun-violence (follow hyperlinks to each individual’s statement) (noting 
various problems that hinder enforcement of federal gun ban for convicted domestic abusers).  
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Even if undercharging did not impede the detection of defendants who violate 
Lautenberg,  another  significant  problem would  remain:  defendants  convicted  of 
simple assault  sometimes  lack notice of  the gun ban.151 As Chief  Justice Roberts 
noted  in  his Hayes  dissent,  “an  individual  should  not  go  to  jail  for  failing  to 






A  third  adverse  consequence of undercharging  is  that  the  applicability of 
the gun ban may turn on prosecutorial discretion.  Some commentators welcome 
a  high  level  of discretion  for prosecutors,154  but  other  commentators  note  that 
discretion  invites  arbitrariness  or  vindictiveness  in  the  selection  of  charges.155  
The application of  the gun ban  should not  turn on whether a  local prosecutor 
liked or disliked the defendant at the time the prosecutor charged the predicate 
offense.   The  elimination of discretion would  ensure  that  all  similarly  situated 
defendants receive the same treatment. 
Undercharging of domestic violence has many harmful effects unrelated to 
the  Lautenberg  Amendment.    Undercharging  thwarts  the  intent  of  state 
legislatures  to  match  certain  punishments  to  the  crime  of  domestic  violence.  
Undercharging  also diminishes  the protection of battered women. An  accused 
returning  home  from  jail  shortly  after  a  complaint  may  increase  the 





have  difficulty  demonstrating  her  eligibility  for  government  benefits  and 
 
 151.  For a general discussion of prosecutors’ motives and tactics in plea bargaining and charge 
bargaining, see George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L. J. 857 (2000). 
 152. United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 436 (2009).  
 153.  Hayes, 555 U.S. at 436-37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (in his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts raises 
concerns about “fair warning” due to the uncertain application of the Lautenberg Amendment to 
particular categories of predicate offenses).  
 154. Michael A. Caves, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma:  Obligatory Charging under the Ashcroft Memo, 9 
J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 1–2 (2008) (arguing that Ashcroft’s memo did not adequately take account 
of the prosecutor’s duty to balance several goals, some of which do not align with a charge-to-the-hilt 
mandate); see Kersey, supra note 122121122, at 1932 (favoring prosecutorial discretion in determining 
whether to charge predicates that will result in firearms disability under Lautenberg Amendment; the 
“state prosecutor is in the best position to determine whether the domestic offender is a violent 
offender who will “reach for the gun” or an offender whose actions are mildly offensive but unlikely 
to lead to further violence”).  
 155. See Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 
713, 732–3 (1999) (noting that unchecked prosecutorial discretion “can lead to violations of citizens’ 
rights through the arbitrary or, worse, malevolent exercise of authority”); Murray R. Garnick, Two 
Models of Prosecutorial Vindictiveness, 17 GA. L. REV. 467, 467 (1983) (“With this discretion comes a real 
possibility of prosecutorial abuse”); cf. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 
2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 870 (stressing that charging decision should not turn on arbitrary discretion of 
prosecutor).   
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resources  that  state  legislatures  have made  available  for  battered women.    In 
short,  undercharging  is  a  dishonest  characterization  of  domestic  violence  that 
redounds to the detriment of battered women and society as a whole. 
C. Inadequacy of Safeguards 
There are several safeguards designed to prevent, or mitigate the harms of, 
prosecutors’  tendency  to undercharge  cases  involving domestic violence.   This 
Subpart will consider four categories of safeguards, and argue that none of them 





to  the  FBI  about  the  facts  underlying  misdemeanor  convictions  involving 




the  questionnaires  used  to  determine  whether  ambiguous  misdemeanor 
convictions might qualify as predicates under the Lautenberg Amendment.158  As 
a  result,  a  significant  number  of  convicted  batterers  are  able  to  escape 
accountability  in  background  checks  because  domestic  violence  is  not 
conspicuous  in  their  conviction  records.    The  greater  use  of  factual 
questionnaires  for  the FBI’s databases has not offset  the harm  caused by  local 
prosecutors’ reluctance to charge batterers appropriately. 
  A  second  safeguard,  the  U.S.  Department  of  Justice’s  requirement  that 
prosecutors must charge the most serious offense,159 has not solved the problem 
of undercharging in the context of domestic violence.  The requirement applies at 
the  federal  level,  but  the  federal  government handles very  few misdemeanors 
involving domestic violence.   State agencies and  local district attorneys’ offices 
prosecute  the  lion’s  share  of  domestic  violence  offenses,  but  these  offices 
generally have not imposed such requirements.  Further, the U.S. Department of 
Justice altered its charging policy in 2010 due to concerns about overcharging of 
drug  cases,  so now  even  federal prosecutors have more discretion  in  selecting 
charges.160 
 
 156. For a summary of the relevant requirements in the 2005 VAWA Reauthorization Act,  see 
Ronald Adrine & Alexandria Ruden, Domestic Violence and Firearm Prohibition, in  OHIO DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE LAW, at § 18:13 (Baldwin’s Ohio Handbook Ser. Series., 2014).  
 157. As Senator Grassley noted in his testimony during the hearing of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on July 30, 2014, there are no submissions of Lautenberg predicates to NICS in some 
states, and there are very few submissions in other states. See supra note 124, 129.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors, 
DEPARTMENT POLICY CONCERNING CHARGING CRIMINAL OFFENSES, DISPOSITION OF CHARGES, AND 
SENTENCING (Sept. 22, 2003).   
 160. Memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder to All Federal Prosecutors (May 19, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/holder-memo- 
challenging-sentencing.pdf.  
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  A third safeguard against undercharging is sentencing based on the conduct 
underlying  an  offense,  rather  simply  the  conviction.    The  goal  behind  this 
approach is to sentence offenders based on what they actually did, irrespective of 
how prosecutors  charged  them.161   Proponents  of  sentencing  based  on  offense 
conduct  have  suggested  that  it  might  reduce  some  of  the  incentives  for 
undercharging  and  might  promote  uniformity  in  the  disposition  of  cases.162  
Sentencing  based  on  offense  conduct  has  fallen  far  short  of  this  goal.    State 
courts—which handle  the vast majority of cases  involving domestic violence— 
did  not  embrace  the  new  sentencing  system  to  the  same  extent  as  federal 
courts.163    Even  at  the  federal  level,  prosecutors  were  able  to  limit  their 
presentation  of  offense  conduct  to  judges  in  order  to  ensure  that  sentences 
aligned with  the charges actually  filed.164   An even more  fundamental problem 
with sentencing based on offense conduct arose when  the Supreme Court held 
that the right to trial by jury limits the ability of judges to sentence defendants for 




for  the  involvement of victims  is  that  their  input might  limit  the willingness of 
prosecutors to offer overly generous terms to defendants.  Yet, research does not 
indicate  that  victims  exert  much  influence  over  plea  offers.166    Survivors  of 
domestic violence are particularly unlikely to insist on strict charges, because 80 
percent of  these  survivors will change  their  stories or  refuse  to cooperate with 
the prosecution. 167 
In  sum,  there  is  little  reason  for confidence  in  the various safeguards  that 
 
 161. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2 (2013) (explaining that sentencing 
under the guidelines is based on the conduct actually committed by the defendant in the course of 
committing the offense).   
 162. See Gregory Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 143, 179 
(2011) (noting that one purpose of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in basing sentences on offense 
conduct rather than the offense of conviction was to limit prosecutorial discretion in undercharging 
or dealing down charges, which would undermine the uniformity valued by the Commission).  
 163. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines:  Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1196-1206 (2005) (discussing wide variety of sentencing guidelines at state 
level; few states track the federal sentencing model).   
 164. Douglas A. Berman, Is Fact Bargaining Undermining the Sentencing Guidelines?, FED. SENT’G 
REP., May–MayJune 1996, at 300 (discussing results of study that found large number of federal 
sentences were based not on actual facts of case, but on recital of facts and proposed guideline 
calculations in plea agreements).  
 165. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000) (holding that any fact that increases penalty 
for crime beyond prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to jury at trial phase and proved 
beyond reasonable doubt); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313-14 (2004) (reversing the trial 
court’s imposition of a statutory sentencing enhancement in a domestic violence case because the 
prosecution had not proven the predicate facts to the jury, as required by the Sixth Amendment).  
 166. Susan E. Gegan & Nicholas Ernesto Rodriguez, Victims’ Roles in the Criminal Justice System:  A 
Fallacy of Victim Empowerment?, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 225, 229–37 (1992) (noting that even 
when statutes permit their involvement, victims rarely are able to influence plea negotiations); see 
Sarah N. Weilling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L. Q. 301, 338–42 (1987) 
(summarizing states’ varying approaches to allowing or mandating victims’ participation in plea 
negotiations).  
 167. See supra note 143.   
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purport to limit the harmful effects of undercharging.  The only way to solve the 
problem  is  to  impose a specific obligation on  local prosecutors  to  file  the  right 
charges in cases involving domestic violence. 
IV. A PROPOSED ETHICAL DUTY TO CHARGE BATTERERS APPROPRIATELY 
The  next  subsection  will  set  forth  a  proposed  ethical  rule  guiding 
prosecutors  who  charge  cases  involving  domestic  violence.    The  following 
Subpart  will  consider  the  best  vehicle  for  codifying  such  a  duty.    Finally, 
attention will focus on possible objections to the proposed rule. 
A. Nature of the Ethical Duty 
An  ethical  duty  to  charge  domestic  violence  appropriately  must  include 
several  elements.    It  must  include  an  obligation  to  bring  the  most  serious 
applicable  charge,  and  to  invoke  all  statutes  and  enhancements  specifically 
tailored to cases involving intimate partners as victims or witnesses.  The ethical 
duty  to  charge  appropriately must  include  an obligation  to  avoid dispositions 
that will  hinder  the  subsequent  detection  of  a  qualifying  predicate  under  the 
Lautenberg Amendment.   The  ethical duty must  include  a  “safety valve”  that 
permits  adjustment  of  charges  in  extraordinary  circumstances,  so  long  as  the 
disposition remains proportionate to the offense and accords adequate protection 
to victims and witnesses. 
Here  is  one  possible  formulation  of  an  ethical  duty  to  charge  batterers 
appropriately: 
In a case involving an allegation of domestic violence, a prosecutor must charge 
the most serious offense readily supported by evidence accessible at the time of 
the charging decision.  The charging instrument must include any possibly 
applicable offense or enhancement that specifies the intimate or familial 
relationship between the assailant and victims and/or witnesses, assuming that 
such offense or enhancement is readily supported by evidence accessible at the 
time of the charging decision.  The prosecutor shall not consent to any negotiated 
disposition involving dismissal or expunction except under extraordinary 
circumstances, and in any event, the prosecutor must seek a disposition 
reflecting the gravity of the offense and ensuring reasonable protection of all 
victims from further violence.  In a case involving a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence, a prosecutor shall file thorough records with the court and 
shall submit, or cause to be submitted, thorough information to the National 
Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) in order to ensure that the 
defendant is subject to any applicable firearms disability under federal and state 
law. 
The proposed rule rests on compelling principles.   Prosecutors should not 
subordinate  the  interests of accusers  just because  the United States’ adversarial 
system puts the primary emphasis on the conflict between the government and 
the  accused.  Prosecutors  sometimes  exploit  victims  instrumentally  to  secure 
convictions  in  cases  that  proceed  to  trial,168  regarding  victims  as  nuisances 
 
 168. See Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1358 (2005) (“The simple 
adversarial model does not capture the complexity [of a trial involving domestic violence].  A better 
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hindering  the efficient disposition of cases  through plea bargains or dismissals.  
The  ethical  duty  to  charge  domestic  violence  cases  appropriately would  align 
with  the deontological  imperative  that  every person,  including a  crime victim, 
has  inherent dignity  and moral autonomy; no person  is  simply a means  to  an 
end.  Deontological philosophy also posits that violent crime is a lapse of moral 




rule would  increase  the  odds  that  local  prosecutors would  select  charges  that 
clearly signal the defendant’s commission of domestic violence.  Convictions for 
such  offenses  would  be  more  easily  recognizable  in  NCIS  and  other  law 
enforcement databases,  leading  to  greater  accuracy  in  background  checks  and 
greater detection of § 922(g)(9) violators when police consult the databases after 
search warrants and traffic stops.   More generally, the new duty proposed here 
would  promote  consistency  in  the  treatment  of  cases  involving  domestic 
violence, thereby increasing deterrence of prospective offenders.  Victims would 
gain greater confidence  to  file complaints without  fear of  reprisals after abrupt 
dismissals.    The  proper  charging  of  domestic  violence  would  lead  to  greater 
precision  and  clarity  in  court  records.    When  prosecutors  explicitly  label 
domestic  violence  as  such,  there  is  a  great  likelihood  that  judges  in  marital 
dissolution cases will not award custody to batterers, that battered women will 
be  able  to  qualify  for  special  government  benefits,  and  that  prospective 
employers will not hire batterers for jobs in sensitive settings. 
B. Codifying the Duty 
There  are  several bodies of  authority  regulating  the  ethics of prosecutors.  
Which would be the best vehicle for the proposed rule requiring prosecutors to 
charge batterers appropriately?  This Subpart will consider four options: the ABA 
Model  Rules  of  Professional  Conduct,  the  ABA  Standards  for  Practice 




states’ ethical  codes.   State bars enforce  their ethics codes  through disciplinary 
proceedings.  Harmful consequences, ranging from censure to disbarment, could 
befall violators of the state ethical codes, so attorneys are more attentive to these 
codes  than  to  hortatory,  nonbinding  guidelines.    Another  advantage  of 
regulating  prosecutors  under  state  bars’  ethical  codes  is  that  the  panels 






model posits a trilateral adversarial process, in which the defense, the prosecution, and the accuser all 
vie against one another.”) 
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account of  third‐party  interests when such  interests might not otherwise attract 
sufficient attention.  One example is the Rule 1.6(b) list of exceptions to attorney‐
client confidentiality, allowing disclosure of client information when necessary to 
avert  “reasonably  certain  death  of  substantial  bodily  harm  to  a  third  party,” 
among  other  categories  of  harm  to  third  parties.169   Rule  1.6(b)(7)  also  allows 
attorneys  to  reveal  client  information when necessary  to  comply with  statutes 
that  mandate  reporting  of  child  abuse.170    Another  relevant  example  is  Rule 
4.4(a),  which  directs  that  a  lawyer  representing  a  client  shall  not  unduly 
“embarrass, delay or burden a  third person.”171   The most on‐point example  is 
Rule 3.8, which sets forth several duties of prosecutors with respect to both the 
accused  and  third  parties,  including  a  subpoint  that  regulates  the  charging 
decision.172 A new ethical  rule  to charge batterers appropriately  is a  reasonable 
extension of principles  that  already underlie  the ABA Model Rules  in general, 
and Rule 3.8 in particular.173 
A less desirable option for codifying the new duty would be to include it in 
the  Standards  for Criminal Practice  (Prosecution  Function).   Approved  by  the 
ABA House of Delegates in 1993, these standards set forth specific guidance for 
both prosecutors and defense attorneys.  The standards for prosecutors include a 
list of considerations  to  take  into account when charging a case  initially,174 and 
 
 169. Rule 1.6(b)(1)-(3) and (6)-(7) of the ABA Model Rules provides that:  
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client o the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary:  
  (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;  
  (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to 
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in 
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services; 
  (3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interest or property 
of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission 
of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services;  
  (6) to comply with other law or a court order; or 
  (7) to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer’s change of 
employment or from changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the 
revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise 
prejudice the client. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2014).   
 170. The ABA Model Rules authorize a lawyer to disclose client information when necessary “to 
comply with other law or a court order.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6) (2014). Most 
states have enacted laws that require or permit several categories of professionals, including lawyers, 
to report otherwise confidential information to the appropriate authorities when those professionals 
encounter evidence of child abuse.  For a state-by-state analysis of such statutes, see Comm’n on 
Domestic Violence, American Bar Ass’n, MANDATORY REPORTING OF CHILD ABUSE (2009) (on file with 
author).   
 171. Rule 4.4(a) of the ABA Model Rules provides that, “In representing a client, a lawyer shall 
not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third 
person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.” MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2014).)  
 172. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (2014) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . 
refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.”).  
 173. The rule proposed in this article could go at the end of Rule 3.8 as a freestanding subpoint (i).   
 174. The standard labeled “Discretion in the Charging Decision” includes the following guidance 
concerning decisions to charge or decline prosecution: 
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other  considerations  to  bear  in  mind  when  considering  a  negotiated 
disposition.175    On  first  examination,  the  Standards  might  seem  to  be  a  good 
home for the new duty to charge batterers appropriately: after all, they treat the 
issues of charging and plea negotiation  in more detail  than do  the ABA Model 
Rules.176   But no  state bar has adopted  the Standards  for Criminal Practices as 
part of mandatory regime subject to enforcement through bar discipline.  At best, 
the  Standards  for  Criminal  Practice  are  precatory  and  aspirational,  and 
prosecutors would be  less  likely  to  follow  such nonbinding guidelines  than  to 
obey  the  first‐tier  authority  in  the  state  ethics  codes based on  the ABA Model 
Rules. 
Some prosecutorial agencies have  extensive  in‐house  rules and guidelines 
for  their  attorneys.    For  example,  the  U.S.  Attorneys’  manuals  span  nine 
volumes.177  However, the ethical duty to charge batterers appropriately deserves 
to be codified universally, and  in‐house  regulation would  lead  to a patchwork 
approach.  The local jurisdictions that handle the great bulk of domestic violence 




(b) The prosecutor is not obligated to present all charges which the evidence might 
support.  The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with 
the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist 
which would support a conviction.   
Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising his or 
her discretion are: 
(i) the prosecutor’s reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty; 
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense: 
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular offense or 
the offender; 
(iv) possible improper motives of the complainant; 
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify; 
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension of conviction of others; and 
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction. 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function Standard 3-3.9 (1993).  
 175. Standard 3-3.4.1, labeled “Availability for Plea Discussions,” includes the following 
provisions: 
 The prosecutor should have and make known a general policy or willingness to consult 
with defense counsel concerning disposition of charges by plea. 
 A prosecutor should not engage in plea discussions directly with an accused who is 
represented by defense counsel, except with defense counsel’s approval.  Where the 
defendant has properly waived counsel, the prosecuting attorney may engage in plea 
discussions with the defendant, although, where feasible, a record of such discussions 
should be made and preserved. 
 A prosecutor should not knowingly make false statements or representations of fact or law 
in the course of plea discussions with defense counsel or the accused.  
Id. at 3-3.4.1.   
 176. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 171; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra 
note 172.  
 177. The text of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual is available in the Justice Department’s FOIA Reading 
Room. See U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/ 
foia_reading_room/usam/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).  
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intent of Congress to treat domestic abusers uniformly.178  Another problem with 
in‐house  regulation  is  the  apparent  conflict of  interest when prosecutors  sit  in 
judgment of other prosecutors within the same agency. 
State  statutes  deserve  consideration  as  a  vehicle  for  the  regulation  of 
prosecutorial  ethics,  but  this  approach  might  be  too  radical.    State  bars  are 
generally  reluctant  to  cede  their  self‐regulation  to  legislatures.    In  fact,  the 
legislative branch has rarely taken up the regulation of the legal profession at all.  
Examples  of  statutes  regulating  the  legal  profession  are  most  noteworthy  for 
their  infrequency.179   A proposal  to  legislate new  standards  for  lawyers might 
provoke backlash in state bars at a time when it is important to build a consensus 
in favor of appropriate charging for cases involving domestic violence. 
In  sum,  the  best  place  to  incorporate  an  ethical  duty  to  charge  batterers 
appropriately would be  in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.   The 
new  rule  could  be  a  freestanding  subpoint  (i)  at  the  end  of  Model  Rule  3.8.  
Codification at this level would be most likely to achieve uniform results. 
C. Foreseeable Objections 
Several objections  to  this Article’s proposal  are possible.   The  first  is  that 
limits  on  prosecutorial  discretion  are  generally  undesirable.    When  Attorney 
General John Ashcroft instructed federal prosecutors to charge the most serious 
offense  in  all  categories  of  cases  (subject  to  very  limited  exceptions),180  critics 
complained that the policy  led to draconian sentences and failed to account  for 
unique  circumstances  that might warrant  leniency  in  a particular  case.181   The 
zealous  charging  of  drug  cases  –  which  federal  prosecutors  handle  more 
commonly  than  cases  involving  spousal  abuse  –  drew  especially  strong 
condemnation.182    Eventually Attorney General  Eric Holder  heeded  the  critics 
and  revised  the  Ashcroft  guidelines  to  allow  federal  prosecutors  greater 
 
 178. Senator Lautenberg wanted his amendment to apply uniformly in all states. See 142 CONG. 
REC. S11226 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. S10377-78 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996). Co-
sponsors shared this concern. See 142 CONG. REC. S12341 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Dodd); 142 CONG. REC. H10434 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schroeder); 142 CONG. 
REC. S10380 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); 142 CONG. REC. S10380 (daily ed. 
Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).  
 179. One example is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that Congress passed in the wake of corporate 
scandals in which attorneys neglected their whistleblowing duties. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (imposing, in Section 307, a set of ethical obligations on attorneys 
who practice before the Securities and Exchange Commission).  
 180. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors, (Sept. 22, 
2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm.  
 181. Michael A. Caves, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma:  Obligatory Charging Under the Ashcroft Memo, 9 
J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 1-2 (2008) (arguing that Ashcroft’s memo did not adequately take account 
of the prosecutor’s duty to balance several goals, some of which do not align with a charge-to-the-hilt 
mandate); see Kersey, supra note 122, at 1932 (favoring prosecutorial discretion in determining 
whether to charge predicates that will result in firearms disability under Lautenberg Amendment; the 
“state prosecutor is in the best position to determine whether the domestic offender is a violent 
offender who will “reach for the gun” or an offender whose actions are mildly offensive but unlikely 
to lead to further violence”).   
 182. See generally Susan P. Weinstein, Ethical Considerations for Prosecutors in Drug Courts, 15 CRIM. 
JUST. 26, 29 (complaining that overcharging of drug cases was common and harmful in traditional 
courts).  
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discretion  in  charging.183    The  criticism  of  overcharging  in  federal  drug  cases, 
however,  does  not  apply  with  the  same  force  to  this  article’s  proposal.    The 
punishments prescribed by  federal drug  statutes were  extremely harsh during 
the  era  of  obligatory  charging. By  contrast,  the punishments  for misdemeanor 
crimes  of  domestic  violence  are  generally  lenient.    Drug  prosecutions  do  not 
present the same practical challenges as domestic violence prosecutions, such as 
unavailable  witnesses,  lack  of  cooperators  and  lack  of  physical  evidence.  
Moreover, the history of prosecutorial reluctance to charge domestic violence is 
unique to this category of crime.  Simply put, the need to mandate prosecutorial 
zeal  is  greater,  and  the  effects  are  less  dangerous,  in  the  context  of  domestic 
violence.184 
Some  might  argue  that  a  requirement  of  strict  charging  could  reduce 
opportunities  for  cooperation  by  defendants  in  cases  involving  domestic 
violence.   But batterers typically have  little value  in cooperating as government 
witnesses against co‐defendants, because domestic violence is generally a single‐
defendant  crime.    It  is  true  that  prosecutors might want  batterers  to  agree  to 
participate in treatment programs,185 but lenient initial charges are not necessary 
to entice such participation; the court can require it as part of the sentence, or the 
prosecutor  can  incentivize  it  by  recommending  a  reduced  sentence,  if  not  a 
reduced charge.  A stricter initial charge might actually increase the likelihood of 
cooperation by  the defendant, because he would have more  to  lose  if he were 
uncooperative. 
Another  possible  criticism  is  that  this  article’s  proposal  might  have  a 
“chilling  effect”  on  prosecutors  or  victims  of  domestic  violence.    Perhaps 
prosecutors might prefer to forego charges altogether for fear that dismissals and 
charge  bargaining  would  not  be  possible  if  a  particular  prosecution  proved 
difficult.  Or perhaps victims of domestic violence would not complain to police 
in  the  first  place  if  the  only  possible  outcome  were  a  strict  charge.    These 
concerns are not new, however.   The same concerns arose  in  response  to prior 
initiatives to treat domestic violence more seriously.186  The concerns seem to lack 
merit with  respect  to  prosecutors, who  are  under  political  pressure  to  charge 
domestic violence  even  if  lenient dispositions  are no  longer possible.   Victims 
need  to  summon  police  and  extricate  themselves  from  danger  even  if  the 
consequences befalling  the batterers will be more serious due  to  the new rules.  
Enlightened policy makers have long ago realized that the victims’ sympathy for 
the  abusers  cannot  lead  to  lower  sanctions; punishment  is not  less urgent  just 
 
 183. Memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder to All Federal Prosecutors, DEPARTMENT 
POLICY ON CHARGING AND SENTENCING (May 19, 2010).  
 184. But see Kersey, supra note 122, at 1932 (favoring prosecutorial discretion in determining 
whether to charge predicates that will result in firearms disability under Lautenberg Amendment; the 
“state prosecutor is in the best position to determine whether the domestic offender is a violent 
offender who will “reach for the gun” or an offender whose actions are mildly offensive but unlikely 
to lead to further violence.”).  
 185. E.g., Mary M. Lovik, Specialized Services for Survivors and Perpetrators of Battering, 90 MICH. B. 
J. 44 (2011) (indicating that “courts frequently order batterer intervention as a probation condition for 
persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence crimes”). 
 186. Mandatory arrest policies and no-drop policies also drew criticism that they might result in a 
“chilling effect.”  For a review of arguments on both sides, see Elizabeth M. Schneider, BATTERED 
WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 123 (2000).  
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specific duties on prosecutors, such as  the duty  to  refrain  from calling  lawyers 





the  uniqueness  of  domestic  violence  justifies  this  special  treatment.190    In  any 
event, it is certainly possible to add ethical rules for charging other categories of 
cases in the future. 
In  sum,  the  advantages of  establishing  an  ethical  rule  for  the  charging of 
domestic  violence  outweigh  the  possible  disadvantages.    While  prosecutors 
might  resent  limitations  on  their  discretion,  it  is  more  important  to  promote 
uniformity  in  charging  and  to  protect  battered women  from  potentially  lethal 
violence. 
CONCLUSION 
Many  commentators  hailed  the  Supreme  Court’s  ruling  in  Castleman  as  an 
important  step  forward  in  the  reduction  of  gun‐related  violence  by  convicted 
batterers.  The reality is more complicated. 
  The  Court  in  Castleman  adopted  the  broad  reading  of  the  Lautenberg 
Amendment urged by the government and amici representing women’s groups 
and  law enforcement organizations.   Yet  this  interpretation will not necessarily 
lead  to  an  increase  in  the  number  of  prosecutions  under  the  Lautenberg 
Amendment.    Ironically,  Castleman  may  have  engendered  greater  confidence 
among local prosecutors that convictions under a wide range of assault statutes 
can  count  as  predicates  for  the  federal  gun  ban,  heightening  the  risk  that 
potentially  qualifying  convictions  will  escape  detection  by  federal  law 
enforcement  officials  when  the  records  do  not  clearly  indicate  that  the 
convictions involved domestic violence.  For example, local prosecutors may opt 
to charge generic assault  rather  than domestic assault because  the  two charges 
 
 187. The Model Rules provide that, “A prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . not subpoena a 
lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client 
unless the prosecutor reasonably believes the information sought is not protected from disclosure by 
any applicable privilege; the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing 
investigation or prosecution; and there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e) (2014).  
 188. The trend in ethical codes has been a reduction of general, hortatory provisions and an 
increase in more specific provisions. Mona L. Hymel, Controlling Lawyer Behavior: The Sources and Uses 
of Protocols in Governing Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 874 n.4 (2002) (noting “the broader trend in 
legal ethics toward specific rules and away from broad statements and principles”); Richard W. 
Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 668 (2001) (stating that lawyers’ ethical codes 
“have migrated away from broad standards and toward clearly defined rules”).  
 189. Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes:  Theory, Practice, and the 
Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 243 (1993) (stating that ethical rules that 
“direct particular conduct” are “simpler to enforce”).  
 190. See supra note 142 (discussing unique challenges that arise in prosecuting batterers).   
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seem fungible under Lautenberg, but the former charge may not be conspicuous 
enough to signal the firearms disability to federal officials. 
  The best way  to ensure  the appropriate punishment of gun possession by 
convicted domestic batterers is to charge them appropriately in the first instance.  
Local  prosecutors  who  handle  cases  involving  domestic  violence  should  not 
select generic charges in order to simplify and hasten disposition of these cases.  




that  the  offense  is  readily provable  at  the  time  of  the  charging decision.   The 
proposal would fit well alongside other provisions in the ABA Model Rules that 
require  attorneys  to  take  account  of  third‐party  interests  (in  this  case,  the 
interests of victims and potential victims) when such  interests might otherwise 
attract insufficient attention. 
  Implementation of  the  rule proposed  in  this  article would help  to  ensure 
that a defendant’s conduct, rather than a local prosecutor’s discretion, will be the 
key determinant of  the defendant’s  eligibility  to possess  firearms.   As Senator 
Lautenberg urged nearly 20 years ago, no convicted batterer  should be able  to 




 191. 142 CONG. REC. S10377 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).  
